Health Care Network Formation and Policyholders' Welfare by Bardey, David & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
 10-183 
Research Group: Public Economics August 11, 2010 
 
Health Care Network Formation and 
Policyholders’ Welfare 
DAVID BARDEY AND JEAN-MARC BOURGEON 
Health Care Network Formation and
Policyholders’ Welfare∗
David Bardey†and Jean-Marc Bourgeon‡
August 11, 2010
Abstract
We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers
compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium
and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They
have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health
care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated
with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care qual-
ity and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off
under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a
competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations).
Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer
and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium
than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different ob-
jective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante
providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium
in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp
contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to
model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.
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1 Introduction
Health care markets are characterized by several market failures (Arrow, 1963).
As pointed out in Ma and Riordan (2002), some institutions have emerged as
a response to this issue. Vertical integration, or more generally, vertical agree-
ments between insurers and health care providers, are known to be an efficient
response to incentives problems. Indeed, additionally to the standard argument
of transaction costs reduction, by putting more incentives on the providers’ side,
managed care organizations (MCOs in the following) also allow to ease the trade-
off between risk spreading and copayments on the policyholders’ side (Ma and
McGuire, 1998). However, the formation of health care networks in a strategic
environment remains misunderstood and the MCOs’ impact on policyholders’
welfare is still in debate. As has been observed that MCOs’ plans are cheaper
than conventional insurance, several explanations are given to understand this
stylized fact. On one hand, Baker and Corts (1996) and Baranes and Bardey
(2006) show that MCOs may benefit from a favorable risk segmentation. On
the other hand, some empirical results dealing with health care quality delivered
in MCOs reveal that, on average, the quality perceived is lower in MCOs than
with conventional insurers (Blendon et al., 1998).
There are two goals to this paper. First, we shed light on this quality-price
trade-off issue so as to establish a comparison, expressed in terms of policyhold-
ers’ welfare, between different market structures observed in the health care
sector. Second, we provide a positive argument to explain the formation of
health care networks. For this purpose, we consider a set-up in which two insur-
ers and two providers are present and compete for a fixed mass of policy holders.
Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences
of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to
establish a network of health care. We consider that providers, who are partially
altruistic, are horizontally differentiated. More precisely, they are characterized
by different physical addresses. They choose health care quality and compete
in price. Then, various situations are considered. The first corresponds to the
case where both insurers do not sign any exclusivity contracts with providers.
This situation can be interpreted as a competition model between conventional
insurers. Next, we consider a situation where both insurers sign a vertical agree-
ment with one (different) provider, this situation corresponding to a competition
between MCOs.
We show that policyholders are better off under a competition between con-
ventional insurers rather than under a managed care competition. This result
comes from the fact that under MCOs’ competition, the differentiation at the
upstream level (between providers) goes down to the insurers’ level, allowing
them to charge a positive loading factor to their policyholders. Moreover, as it
relaxes competition intensity, it induces a lower quality level in equilibrium. It is
worth noticing that this insight does not coincide with Gal-Or’s (1997) results in
which providers are horizontally differentiated, but in an ex post perspective, i.e.
ex ante policyholders do not know their preferred health care providers. Indeed,
Gal-Or shows that due to the lower prices paid to the providers, policyholders
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get a higher utility under a competition between integrated insurers. Ma (1997)
also analyzes the vertical foreclosure strategy with (ex post) differentiated up-
stream firms while downstream products are sold as option contracts. From the
consumers’ point of view, Ma reveals that vertical integration consequences are
ambiguous and can increase or reduce their welfare.
After that, we continue analyzing the MCOs’ competition but this time
considering the situation in which one insurer is a mutual, whereas the other one
is a private insurer. We reveal the properties of this asymmetric equilibrium.
More precisely, we show that due to the nature of its objective, the mutual
obtains a higher market share than the private insurer. Providers take advantage
of the mutual’s objective to increase their mark-up. Moreover, we find that
the health care quality provided is higher in the mutual than in the private
insurer. Next, we analyze the outcome of the competition between an HMO
and a conventional insurer. We reveal that the equilibrium outcome of the
game is similar to the preceding equilibrium obtained.
Finally, we analyze the game that determines the market structure that may
emerge in equilibrium. Each insurer can choose between an exclusionary and
a nonexclusionary strategy. Under the first modality, patients can only obtain
health care services from the provider who belongs to their insurer’s network.
On the contrary, under the second modality, each insurer signs contracts with
both providers. Several equilibria may emerge at the outcome of the game.
Nevertheless, our results show that the equilibria in which both insurers select
one distinct provider, i.e. exclusionary equilibrium - allow them to reach the
highest profit level.
It is interesting to analyze this result with respect to the related litera-
ture. In an automobile insurance context, Bourgeon et al. (2007) provide an
analysis in which some (ex ante) differentiation is present in the providers’ mar-
ket. They also show that an exclusionary equilibrium emerges in equilibrium.
Gal-Or (1997) considers a framework in which both levels, i.e. upstream and
downstream levels are differentiated. She points out that a nonexclusionary
equilibrium arises under the realistic assumption that providers are more differ-
entiated than insurers. On the contrary, when insurers are more differentiated
than providers, they both choose an exclusionary strategy. Actually, it is in
sharp contrast with our findings. This difference is due to the option value
assumption adopted in her framework coming from the ex post horizontal dif-
ferentiation. Indeed, Gal-Or (1997,1999) considers that ex ante, i.e. under the
veil of ignorance, providers deliver health care services perceived as equivalent
whereas ex post (after falling ill), each patient has a preferred provider. Due to
this, policyholders may suffer from a disutility, calculated in expectation, when
their choice among providers is restricted. However, Gal-Or shows that they
are better off because it allows insurers to bargain lower health care prices and
by consequence, lower premia.
According to the difference in results obtained, it is worth discussing the
conceptual difference behind these two assumptions dealing with the providers’
horizontal differentiation. This assumption of ex post differentiation suits health
care markets particularly well if it is interpreted as providers’ specialization
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strategies. For instance, some hospitals can benefit from a better reputation for
treating some particular pathologies.1 In contrast, when providers’ horizontal
differentiation has a geographical/distance interpretation, Capps et al. (2003)
point out that it is more convincing to consider that patients know ex ante
their preferred providers.2 It is worth noticing that due to this interpretation of
ex ante horizontal differentiation that characterizes providers’ competition, our
paper may constitute the first analysis to succeed in explaining, by using only
strategic interactions arguments, the health care network formation observed
in practice. Under the option value approach, Gal-Or shows that health care
network could emerged at equilibrium only if insurers were more differentiated
than providers, which does not seem to be the most realistic assumption.
In the next section, we present the set-up. Section 3 is devoted to some
preliminary considerations dealing with the providers’ price-quality competition
issue. The comparison between different market structures of the health care
sector is exposed section 4. Section 5 provides an equilibrium analysis. Section
6 concludes.
2 The set-up
Three actors are considered in the model:
Policyholders: There is a unit mass of risk averse policyholders, character-
ized by an initial wealth w. They differ by a physical address and are uniformly
located over a Hotelling line of interval [0, 1]. Each policyholder may suffer
from a disease with a probability pi. They have preferences described by a two-
argument utility function. The first component is a von Neuman-Morgenstern
utility function u over his ex post wealth with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, the concavity
capturing the risk aversion. In case of illness, patients visit a provider j that
provides health care of quality qj . Then, patients obtain a positive utility v(qj),
with v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. In words, the quality of health care has a positive
impact on patients’ health state but with decreasing return. To visit a provider
j, patients entail a disutility proportional to the distance t |x− xj |. If healthy,
policyholders obtain a wealth equal to w − kji , where kji denotes the premium
paid to insurer i. In case of illness, patients pay a price pj to provider j and
receive an indemnity sji + k
j
i from insurer i. Their wealth is thus w + s
j
i − pj .
Hence, if a policy holder takes out a health insurance contract from insurer i
and buys service of quality qj offered by provider j at price pj in case of illness,
1Moreover, it can be a simple manner to introduce some vertical differentiation between
providers. For instance, Baranes and Bardey (2006) and Bardey and Rochet (2010) use this
ex post horizontal differentiation argument to introduce some vertical differentiation among
insurers and to capture the risk segmentation that occurs between conventional insurers and
MCOs or between PPOs and HMOs respectively.
2See also Bijslma et al. (2010) in a similar framework and Bardey et al. (2010) deal-
ing with a regulation issue for an opened discussion around the interpretation of horizontal
differentiation in providers’ market .
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his expected utility can be written
EU = (1− pi)u
(
w − kji
)
+ pi
[
u
(
w + sji − pj
)
+ v(qj)− t |x− xj |
]
.
Providers: Suffering from an illness, policy holders can visit two providers,
denoted by j ∈ {0, 1}. For purpose of simplicity, we assume that each provider
has the same cost function c(q) that depends on the quality q delivered with
c′ > 0 and c′′ ≥ 0. The two providers are located at the extremities of the
segment of length 1, namely at x0 = 0 and x1 = 1 for providers j = 0 and j = 1
respectively. Each provider j’s decides simultaneously on the quality standard
qj of health care delivered to patients and sets the price pj . The number of
patients that visit provider j then depends on the providers’ price policies and
the insurance contracts. Denoting by Xji the number of policyholders having
an insurance contract from insurer i that visit provider j, her total demand is
thus
∑
iX
j
i . Provider j’s objective is given by:
Φj =
∑
i
φ(qj , pj , s
j
i )X
j
i ,
under the constraint pj ≥ c(qj), where
φ(q, p, s) = p− c(q) + γ [u (w + s− p) + v(q)]
is the per-patient utility obtained by the provider that depends on two compo-
nents. The first-one is the net remuneration p − c(q) they receive. The second
component denotes the altruism of the providers. Roughly speaking, they put
a weight γ on their patients’ utility. γ = 0 implies that the providers are pure
profit maximizers, and of course, we must have γ small enough to ensure that
pj > c(qj), which we assume in the following.3
Insurers: Two insurers, denoted by i = {A,B} offer health plan contracts
(k0i , s
0
i , k
1
i , s
1
i ) that depend on the structure of providers’ affiliation that we detail
in the following. If for example k0i = k
1
i = ki and s
0
i = s
1
i = si (same insurance
contracts with whomever the policy holder wants to visit), the profit function
of insurer i is given by:
Πi = [(1− pi)ki − pisi]Di,
where Di denotes the total number of policy holders of insurer i. More generally,
we have
Πi =
∑
j
[
(1− pi)kji − pisji
]
Dji .
The timing of the game is the following:
3For γ large, the provider j’s program is to maximize patients’ utility under a break-even
constraint, i.e. max
{
u
(
w + sji − pj
)
+ v(qj) : pj − c(qj) ≥ 0
}
. Of course, at the optimum
we have pj = c(qj) and the optimal quality level solves u
′
(
w + sji − c(qj)
)
c′(qj) = v′(qj)
and thus depends on the health plan net indemnity.
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1. Insurers decide on the provider(s) they affiliate. If provider j does not
appear in health plan i, we adopt the convention that kji = s
j
i = 0.
2. Insurers offer health plans {kji , sji} with i ∈ {A,B} and j ∈ {0, 1} and si-
multaneously, providers post prices pj and choose their standard of quality
qj .
3. Given the observed health plans and providers prices, patients choose at
most one insurance.
4. Finally, if sick, policyholders visit a provider among those who are affili-
ated to their insurer.
3 Preliminary considerations
Before comparing different health care organizations, we determine the social
optimum from an ex ante and ex post points of view.4 Because of policyholders’
risk aversion, ex ante, the first-best is characterized by full insurance, i.e. s =
k − p against an actuarial premium: k = pic(q). Ex post, the socially efficient
level of health care quality qFB is solution of
max
q
u(w − pic(q)) + piv(q),
and thus solves
v′(qFB) = u′(w − pic(qFB))c′(qFB).
The first-best quality level qFB satisfies the equality between the marginal
benefit generated by health care and its marginal cost. It is worth noticing that
this marginal cost is calculated for an actuarial value of the premium pic(qFB).
These considerations are summed-up in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The first best allocation is characterized by:
i) Full insurance against an actuarial premium pic(qFB).
ii) A level of quality that satisfies: v′(qFB) = u′(w − pic(qFB))c′(qFB).
The level of quality obtained in the first best and the premium corresponding
is crucial to compare and to assess the allocations efficiency corresponding to
the different market structures depicted in the next section. Interestingly, we
shall see in the following that at an equilibrium where the insurers charge the
same premium k, providers j’ optimal quality satisfies the condition
v′(qj) = u′(w − k)c′(qj),
whatever γ, the level of the providers’ altruism. While the providers’ altru-
ism does not explicitly appear in this equation, it influences the nature of the
equilibrium; an effect that is embedded in the insurance premium level. A total
differentiation of the previous equation gives:
4See Geoffard (2006) for a similar analysis in an ex post moral hazard context.
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Customers
Provider 0 Provider 1
Insurer A Insurer B
Figure 1: Conventional insurance.
Lemma 2 The level of quality delivered decreases with the insurer’s premium.
dqj
dk
= − u
′′(w − k)c′(qj)
v′′(qj)− c′′(qj)u′(w − k) < 0.
Hence, if the providers’ prices exceed the cost of service, which is typically
the case when the altruism coefficient is low, or if insurers apply a positive
loading factor on premia, the quality of the health service is lower than the
first-best level. More generally, a negative shock on patients’ income reduces
the quality provided. This result comes from a wealth effect due to the concavity
of the utility function (with respect to wealth).
4 Comparison of different market structures
In this section, we analyze and compare different affiliation structures. First, we
consider a competition between conventional insurers, i.e. insurance companies
affiliate both providers: insurer j then charges the same premium k0j = k
1
j = kj
and reimburses the same indemnity kj + sj whatever the provider chosen by
the policyholder. Second, we consider the competition between insurers, which
adopt an MCO form, i.e. exclusive affiliation of provider. Next, we analyze this
market structure when one MCO is a private insurer while the other one is a
mutual that maximizes its policyholders’ surplus. Finally, we characterize the
equilibrium of the game when an MCO competes with a conventional insurer.
4.1 Conventional insurance
In the non-exclusive affiliation case, both insurers have affiliated both providers.
Figure 1 represents the situation under consideration.
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We directly focus on symmetric equilibria of that subgame in which insurers
offer the same policy, i.e. kjA = k
j
B = k
∗ and sjA = s
j
B = s
∗ for j ∈ {0, 1} while
providers offer the same couple price-quality, i.e. (p1, q1) = (p0, q0) = (p∗, q∗).
4.1.1 Competition between insurers
In such a situation, insurers are not differentiated in the sense that policyholders
can visit whoever health provider they like in the case they get sick. Hence,
insurers compete in a framework of perfect competition. Therefore, competition
between insurers leads them to solve the following program:
(k∗, s∗) ∈ arg max
k,s
{(1−pi)u(w− k) +pi [u(w − p∗ + s) + v(q∗)] : (1−pi)k = pis}.
Introducing the insurers’ budget constraint in the objective function leads
to: {
s∗ = (1− pi)p∗,
k∗ = pip∗.
The equilibrium in this subgame involves full insurance for policyholders and
actuarial premia.
4.1.2 Competition between providers
A proportion pi of policyholders suffer from a disease and are willing to buy
health care treatments offered by providers in the market. Let us denote by
x˜ the address over [0, 1] that defines the marginal patient who is indifferent
between provider 0 and 1. We have
x˜ =
1
2
+
1
2t
[
u(w − p0 + s∗) + v(q0)− u(w − p1 + s∗)− v(q1)] ,
and demands for provider 0 and 1 are given by X0 = pix˜ and X1 = pi(1 − x˜)
respectively. Provider j’s program is(
qj , pj
) ∈ arg max
p,q
{φ(q, p, s∗)Xj : p ≥ c(q)}.
Assuming that providers are relatively selfish, i.e. γ is low enough, we have
pj > c(qj). Therefore, the optimal price and quality delivered by provider 0’s,
given the health service of provider 1, verify the following first-order conditions:
[1− γu′(w + s∗ − p0)] x˜− φ(q0, p0, s
∗)u′(w + s∗ − p0)
2t
= 0 (1)
and,
− [c′(q0)− γv′(q0)] x˜+ φ(q0, p0, s
∗)v′(q0)
2t
= 0. (2)
Combining these two expressions, we get
v′(q0) = u′(w − k∗)c′(q0)
as mentioned above. At the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain:
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Lemma 3 When γ is low, i.e. p∗ > c(q∗), health care price and quality are
given by the following system:
v′(q∗) = c′(q∗)u′(w − pip∗), (3)
and,
φ(q∗, p∗, (1− pi)p∗) = t (1− γu
′(w − pip∗))
u′(w − pip∗) . (4)
Equation (4) reveals that providers obtain some rents in equilibrium due to
the horizontal differentiation that characterizes their market. In particular, if
providers are selfish, (4) becomes
φ(q∗, p∗, (1− pi)p∗) = t/u′(w − pip∗).
with the first-best situation at the limit case t = 0. However, if providers are
sufficiently altruistic, i.e. γ large enough to have p = c(q), the first-best situation
is the result of the market competition even when t > 0 since insurance premia
are actuarially fair. More generally, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium (p∗, q∗, s∗, k∗) with conventional in-
surance:
1. Insurers offer full coverage at actuarial price: s∗ = (1−pi)p∗ and k∗ = pip∗.
2. If providers are relatively selfish, the price of health service verifies p∗ >
c(q∗), the quality level of health services is lower than the first best value
i.e. q∗ < qFB and the corresponding insurance premium high k∗ > kFB.
Otherwise, q∗ = qFB and p∗ = c(qFB).
Proposition 1 says that competition between conventional insurers allows to
achieve the ex ante efficiency criterion. When providers are sufficiently altru-
istic, they also choose the first-best quality level and set a price equal to its
marginal cost. On the contrary, if they are more selfish, they obtain a positive
mark-up p∗− c(q∗) and they choose a quality standard lower than the first best
level. Finally, it is worth noticing that in spite of the ex ante providers’ dif-
ferentiation, there is no market failure in a competition between conventional
insurers as long as providers are sufficiently altruistic.
4.2 Competition between MCOs
Let us now consider the case of exclusive affiliation. Without loss of generality,
we consider that insurer A makes a contract with provider 0 while insurer B
has an agreement with provider 1 as illustrated in Fig. 2.
Insurers A and B thus verify {k1A, s1A} = {k0B , s0B} = {0, 0} and, as we focus
on a symmetric equilibrium, {k0A, s0A} = {k1B , s1B} = {kˆ, sˆ}.
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Customers
Provider 0 Provider 1
Insurer A Insurer B
Figure 2: Competition between HMOs.
4.2.1 Competition in contracts between insurers
In this framework, patients have to visit the provider affiliated to their insurer.
As usual, the horizontal differentiation that characterizes providers’ competition
drops to the health insurance market. The marginal policyholder, the individual
who is indifferent between the two health plans, is located at
x˜ =
1
2
+
1
2pit
{
pi
[
u
(
w + s0A − p0
)− u (w + s1B − p1)+ v(q0)− v(q1)]
+ (1− pi) [u (w − k0A)− u (w − k1B)]} , (5)
which also corresponds to the demand addressed to insurer A (and 1 − x˜ to
insurer B). Insurer A maximizes its profit:
(k0A, s
0
A) ∈ arg max
k,s
[(1− pi)k − pis] x˜.
At a symmetric equilibrium, the premium and the indemnity are then char-
acterized as follows: {
sˆ+ kˆ = pˆ,
kˆ = pipˆ+ pit/u′(w + sˆ− pˆ).
The equilibrium of this subgame indicates that policyholders still benefit
from full insurance in spite of the positive loading factor charged by the insurers
i.e. ex ante efficiency is still achieved.
4.2.2 Competition at the providers’ level
At the upstream level, under exclusive agreements, the provider gets a fraction
pi of the insurer who belongs to the same network. Hence, provider 0’s problem
can be written as
max
p,q
{φ(q, p, sˆ)pix˜ : p ≥ c(q)}.
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Still assuming that γ is low enough, the first-order conditions are similar to
(1) and (2). We obtain:
Lemma 4 In a symmetric equilibrium with exclusive affiliation
(
pˆ, qˆ, sˆ, kˆ
)
:
i) Insurers offer full coverage at non actuarial price: sˆ+ kˆ = pˆ and kˆ−pipˆ =
pit/u′(w + sˆ− pˆ).
ii) If providers are relatively selfish, the quality and the price of health ser-
vices verify
v′(qˆ) = c′(qˆ)u′(w − kˆ).
As observed above, the exclusive affiliation structure allows insurers to cap-
ture some of the providers’ rent since the premia are not actuarial in equilibrium.
This result is standard in the vertical integration literature in general, and de-
picted in Ma (1997) for the health care sector. Even though ex ante insurers are
identical, vertical agreements allow them to take advantage of the horizontal dif-
ferentiation that characterizes the providers’ market (embedded in t > 0). The
quality of the providers’ service follows the same rule as in the non-exclusive af-
filiation case: it corresponds to the level of quality that maximizes the patients’
utility under the constraint of reaching a minimum mark-up level. However,
as the premium is no longer actuarially fair, kˆ and k∗ take different values.
It affects both the quality and price values. The next proposition compares
the allocations obtained in the two affiliation structure, i.e. non-exclusive and
exclusive affiliations:
Proposition 2 Compared to non-exclusive affiliation, exclusive affiliation in-
duces:
i) A lower provider price: pˆ < p∗.
ii) A lower health service quality: qˆ < q∗.
iii) An higher premium: kˆ > k∗.
Proof. See appendix.
Consequently, policyholders reach a higher expected utility under non-exclusive
affiliation than under exclusive affiliation thanks to a higher quality and a lower
premium. On the contrary, providers are worse off because on one hand, they
supply a lower quality (the altruism component) and on the other, they benefit
from a lower mark-up. Insurers are better off because the exclusive affiliation
transfers the providers’ differentiation at the downstream level.
Proposition 2 does not signify that in a market where a MCO and a conven-
tional insurer would compete each other, policyholders that would have chosen
the conventional insurer would necessarily be better off than policyholders affili-
ated to the MCO. Proposition 2 only shows that policyholders are better off in a
competition between conventional insurers rather than in a competition between
MCOs. The mixed duopoly properties are analyzed in the next sub-section.
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4.3 Competition between two integrated insurers: Mutual
vs private MCO
In this case, we still maintain the exclusive affiliation framework. The only dif-
ference concerns the insurers’ nature. Without loss of generality, let us consider
that insurer A is a mutual while insurer B is a private insurer. We thus con-
sider that B is a profit maximizer while A maximizes his policyholders’ surplus
subject to a budget constraint.
4.3.1 Insurers’ market
At the downstream level, insurer A’s program is to maximize his policy holders’
expected utility under a break-even constraint:
max
kA,sA
{(1− pi)u(w − kA) + pi [u(w − p0 + sA) + v(q0)] : (1− pi)kA = pisA},
which leads to {
sA = (1− pi)p0,
kA = pip0.
As insurer B is a profit maximizer, his program is:
max
kB ,sB
[(1− pi)kB − pisB ] (1− x˜),
where x˜ is defined by (5). The first order conditions lead to:{
sB + kB = p1,
kB = pip1 + pi (1− x˜) 2t/u′(w − kB).
Policyholders who choose B thus have full insurance. Nevertheless, insurer
B benefits from his provider’s market power to charge a positive loading factor
in the premium.
Remark 1 Note that if t = 0, the equilibrium is symmetric.
When t = 0, each insurer, independently of his objective, maximizes their
policyholders’ surplus. It leads to a symmetrical equilibrium in which providers
and insurers make no profit
4.3.2 Providers’ market
The providers’ programs are unchanged and lead to the following conditions:
v′(q1) = c′(q1)u′(w − kB),
v′(q0) = c′(q0)u′(w − kA).
Let us define τ as the loading factor charged by insurer B. The following
proposition characterizes and compares the slope of control variables i.e. q and
p, with respect to τ at the plot τ = 0.
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Proposition 3 When τ is low (t close to zero) and c(q) = q, the following
properties hold:
i) Quality increases more in the mutual than in the private insurer: dq0/dτ >
dq1/dτ.
ii) Providers’ prices increase more in the mutual than in the private insurer:
dp0/dτ > dp1/dτ.
iii) In the mutual, the provider’s mark-up increases d[p0 − q0]/dτ > 0.
iv) In the private insurer, the provider’s mark-up increases less rapidly than
in the mutual d[p1 − q1]/dτ < d[p0 − q0]/dτ.
v) The mutual’s market share increases.
Proof. See appendix.
As we previously pointed out, the situation t = 0 corresponds to a sym-
metrical equilibrium in which neither the insurers nor the providers make prof-
its. Proposition 3 allows us to characterize some properties of the asymmetric
equilibrium, i.e. what would happen in the neighborhood of this symmetric
equilibrium as long as the differentiation increases at the upstream level. First,
due to the fact that it does not charge a positive loading factor, the mutual
increases his market share (v). Concerning the providers, we have two effects at
work: On the one hand, they seek to increase the quality provided for a given
price. On the other hand, for a given quality level, they set an higher price
to increase their profits. Because of the asymmetry between the insurers, the
resulting effects are in favor of the provider affiliated to the mutual (provider 0)
who takes advantage of the higher market share of the mutual: she provides a
higher quality than provider 1 in equilibrium (i), she charges an higher price (ii)
which allow her to increase her mark-up more heavily than provider 1 (points
iii and iv).
4.4 MCO vs conventional insurer competition
The last case considered occurs when an insurer, say A, affiliates only one
provider, say 0, while B affiliates both providers. We go back to the previous
assumption and consider that they are both profit maximizers. This situation
is represented in the following figure.
Because the two insurers offer a health plan for provider 0, competition is
fierce and results in health plans with complete insurance at actuarially fair
premia for this provider. Then, we have
kA = k0B = pip0
and,
sA = s0B = (1− pi)p0,
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and no insurer extracts a rent from provider’s 0 health plan. In contrast, indi-
viduals who choose provider 1 are all insured by insurer B5. Hence, the situation
in term of insurance plans is similar to the MCO vs mutual case analyzed above:
the expression of the indifferent consumer’s location is the same as above and
insurer B determines his offer (k1B , s
1
B) for provider 1 by solving:
max
kB ,sB
[(1− pi)kB − pisB ] (1− x˜).
It is thus apparent that this situation results in the same insurance plans
and providers’ prices and qualities as above, because the competition between
insurers on provider 0 results in the same plan as the one offered by a mutual
and also because insurer B has an exclusive link with provider 1.
5 Market structure
In the previous section, all the possible affiliation structures have been reviewed.
Following Gal-Or (1997), we can now determine whether some of them are more
likely than others to emerge by considering the first stage of the game: at the
very beginning, before insurers and providers make their offer, insurers choose
non-cooperatively to affiliate one or both providers. Denote by Rˆ the insurer
profit under exclusive affiliation, i.e. Rˆ = [(1 − pi)pˆ − sˆ]/2. As shown in the
previous subsection, the profit of the insurance company which affiliates both
providers in the asymmetric affiliation case is strictly smaller than Rˆ : he makes
no profit on the insureds who have chosen the provider shared with his rival,
and due to this fierce competition, the market share on his exclusive provider
is reduced. To reduce the notational burden, his profit in that case is denoted
by Rˆ− η (with Rˆ > η > 0) without loss of generality.
For the sake of clarity, the payoffs for the insurers in the different configu-
rations are summarized in Table 1.
````````````Insurer A
Insurer B
Provider 0 Provider 1 Provider 0 & 1
Provider 0 (0, 0) (Rˆ, Rˆ) (0, Rˆ− η)
Provider 1 (Rˆ, Rˆ) (0, 0) (0, Rˆ− η)
Provider 0 & 1 (Rˆ− η, 0) (Rˆ− η, 0) (0, 0)
Table 1: Insurers’ payoffs depending on the affiliation choices.
A look at this table shows that there are tree Nash equilibria of this affiliation
game: two of them correspond to exclusive affiliation ((Provider 0, Provider
5We have also explored the situation in which insurer B affiliates both providers but offer
a unique insurance contract containing cross-subsidies. However, in such content, there is no
equilibrium.
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1) and (Provider 1, Provider 0)), while (Provider 0&1, Provider 0&1) is the
conventional insurance situation. As the exclusive affiliation cases correspond
to the higher profits levels, we have the following result:
Proposition 4 The affiliation game has three Nash equilibria: the two exclu-
sive affiliation structures and the non-exclusive affiliation structure. From the
insurers’ standpoint, the exclusive affiliation equilibria Pareto-dominate the non-
exclusive affiliation equilibrium.
If insurance insurer A decides to affiliate exclusively one provider, it is an
optimal decision for the rival insurance insurer B to affiliate exclusively the
remaining provider: indeed, choosing not to compete with the segment of pa-
tients who visit provider 0 softens the competition between providers and allows
insurer B to raise his profit.
6 Conclusion
The model provided allows us to point out several results dealing with the net-
work issue in health care markets. The first part of the model is devoted to the
comparison of policyholders’ welfare according to the market structure consid-
ered. First, we show that policyholders’ welfare is better off under a competition
between conventional insurers rather than under a competition between MCOs.
Second, it emphasizes that the competition between two MCOs, one private in-
surer and one mutual, leads to a similar equilibrium than a competition between
a conventional insurer and a MCO.
The last part of the paper characterizes the market structure endogenously.
We show that exclusive affiliation structures emerge in the equilibrium of the
game. This result is in sharp contrast with previous findings that deal with
this issue. We identify that this difference is due to the providers’ horizontal
differentiation assumption. In this paper, we consider that policyholders’ pref-
erences, according to the set of providers, are determined ex ante and not ex
post. If the two assumptions make sense and correspond to different aspects of
the horizontal dimension, it is interesting to note that only an ex ante horizontal
differentiation framework explains the formation of health care networks that
we observe in practice.
This paper could be extended in different ways. First, as considered in
Bijlsma et al. (2010), it would be worth analyzing the impact of the equilibrium
when a positive mass consumers remain uninsured. It could change the nature
of the equilibrium and modify the conclusion in terms of welfare comparisons.
Second, according to the fact that the results obtained in the literature are
sharply different, it would be interesting to consider a bi-dimensional horizontal
differentiation, i.e. ex ante as in the present paper and ex post, as in Gal-Or
(1997, 1999) and Ma (2002) in order to characterize some different regions of
equilibria obtained according to the set of parameters. Finally, it would be
useful to consider the policyholders and the providers’ segmentation among the
15
insurers. It would allow to make the bridge with a two-sided market perspective,
as it is considered in Bardey and Rochet (2010).
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
The levels of quality supplied in each affiliation case satisfy qˆ = Q(kˆ) and q∗
= Q(k∗) where Q(k) is the function implicitly defined by
v′(Q) = c′(Q)u′(w − k).
A total differentiation gives Q′(k) = c′u′′/[c′′u′−v′′] < 0, implying that qˆ < q∗ if
kˆ > k∗. As kˆ > pipˆ, let us denote kˆ = τˆpipˆ where τˆ > 1 and recall that k∗ = pip∗.
The providers’ first-order conditions can be written as ψγ(pˆ, τ) = t = ψγ(p∗, 1)
where
ψγ(p, τ) ≡ {p− c(Q(τpip)) + γ[u(w − τpip) + v(Q(τpip))]} u
′(w − τpip)
1− γu′(w − τpip) .
Consider the case γ = 0, i.e. ψ0(p, τ) ≡ [p− c(Q(τpip))]u′(w − τpip). We have
∂ψ0(p, τ)
∂p
= [1− c′(Q)Q′(τpip)τpi]u′(w − τpip)− [p− c(Q)]u′′(w − τpip)τpi > 0
and,
∂ψ0(p, τ)
∂τ
= −c′(Q)Q′(τpip)pipu′(w − τpip)− [p− c(Q)]u′′(w − τpip)ppi > 0.
We thus have ψ0(pˆ, 1) < ψ0(pˆ, τˆ) = ψ0(p∗, 1) implying pˆ < p∗. Now, suppose
that kˆ ≤ k∗ which implies qˆ ≥ q∗ and since u(·) is concave, u′(w−k∗) ≥ u′(w−kˆ).
As pˆ < p∗, we have pˆ − c(qˆ) < p∗ − c(q∗) and thus t = [pˆ− c(qˆ)]u′(w − kˆ) <
[p∗ − c(q∗)] u′(w − k∗) = t, hence a contradiction. We thus have kˆ > k∗ and
qˆ < q∗. As ψγ(p, τ) is continuous in γ for γ close to zero, these results are not
challenged for γ > 0 as long as γ is small. Observe that these results are not
challenged when providers are very altruistic. Indeed, we have p∗ = c(q∗) with q∗
solving χ(q∗, 1) = 0 and pˆ = c(qˆ) with χ(qˆ, τˆ) = 0 where χ(q, τ) ≡ q−Q(τpic(q)).
As
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∂χ(q, τ)
∂q
= 1−Q′(τpic(q))τpic′(q) > 0
and,
∂χ(q, τ)
∂τ
= −Q′(τpic(q))pic(q) > 0
it comes χ(qˆ, 1) < χ(qˆ, τˆ) = χ(q∗, 1) implying qˆ < q∗, and thus p∗ > pˆ. q∗
maximizes u(w + s∗ − c(q)) + v(q) leading to u′(w − k∗) = v′(q∗)/c′(q∗) and qˆ
maximizes u(w + sˆ− c(q)) + v(q). As
d
dq
[
v′(q)
c′(q)
]
=
v′′(q)c′(q)− v′(q)c′′(q)
c′(q)2
< 0,
the concavity of u(·) implies u′(w−kˆ) = v′(qˆ)/c′(qˆ) > v′(q∗)/c′(q∗) = u′(w−k∗),
and thus kˆ > k∗.
B Proof of Proposition 4
Consider first the case of very altruistic providers, implying pj = c(qj). As
k0 = pip0 and k1 = τpip1 with τ > 1, the quality levels are given by q0 = h(1)
and q1 = h(τ) where h(τ) is the function implicitly defined by
v′(h) = c′(h)u′(w − τpic(h)).
Differentiating gives h′(τ) = u′′picc′/[−u′′τpi(c′)2+u′c′′−v′′] < 0, implying that
q1 < q0 hence p1 < p0. As qj = Q(kj) with Q′(k) < 0 (see above), we also have
k1 > k0.
Consider now the case of selfish providers, i.e., γ = 0. The first-order con-
ditions of the providers’ programs simplify to
x˜ =
[p0 − c(q0)]u′(w − kA)
2t
, (6)
1− x˜ = [p1 − c(q1)]u
′(w − kB)
2t
,
where kA = pip0 and kB = τpip1 with τ > 1. Adding these two equations gives,
using c(q) = q,
2t = [p0 − c(q0)]u′(w − pip0) + [p1 − c(q1)]u′(w − τpip1).
Using (5) and (6), we also obtain
pi(p0 − q0)u′(w − pip0) = pit+ pi [v(q0)− v(q1)] + u (w − pip0)− u (w − τpip1) .
Differentiating these two equations yields
dp0(u′0 − piu′′0m0)− dq0u′0 + dp1v′1 + dq1(−v′1 + v′′1m1) = 0,
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dp0(2u′0 − piu′′0m0)− 2u′0dq0 − τu′1dp1 + v′1dq1 = p1u′1dτ,
where mj = pj − qj , j ∈ {0, 1}.
Differentiating v′(qi) = c′(qi)u′(w − kj) for each provider-insurer pair gives
τpiu′′1dp1 + v
′′
1dq1 = −p1piu′′1dτ,
piu′′0dp0 + v
′′
0dq0 = 0.
We thus obtain the following system
dp0/dτ
dq0/dτ
dp1/dτ
dq1/dτ
 = p1u′1A(τ)−1

0
1
−piu′′1/u′1
0

where
A(τ) =

u′0 − piu′′0m0 −u′0 v′1 −v′1 + v′′1m1
2u′0 − piu′′0m0 −2u′0 −τu′1 v′1
0 0 τpiu′′1 v
′′
1
piu′′0 v
′′
0 0 0

When t→ 0, we have τ → 1 and p1 → p0, q1 → q0 and the same for the marginal
utility levels. Hence, using v′0 = u
′
0 we get
∆ ≡ det(A(1)) = pi2u′′20 [m0v′′0 (4v′0 −m0v′′0 )− 3u′20 ]− 2piv′′0u′′0u′0 (3u′0 − 2m0v′′0 )− 3u′20 v′′20
< 0
and we obtain
dp0
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
= −p0v′20 v′′0 (piu′′0 + v′′0 )/∆ > 0,
dq0
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
= −piu
′′
0
v′′0
dp0
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
< 0
dp1
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
= {u′′20 v′′20 + piu′0u′′0v′′0 (4u′0 − 3v′′0m0) + pi2u′′20 [u′0(3v′0 − 4v′′0m0) + v′′0 v′′0m20]}p0/∆
< 0,
dq1
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
= p0piu′′0v
′
0[2u
′
0v
′′
0 + piu
′′
0(2u
′
0 −m0v′′0 )]/∆ < 0,
dq1
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
− dq0
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
=
p0piu
′′
0v
′
0
∆
[2u′0v
′′
0 + piu
′′
0(2u
′
0 −m0v′′0 )− (piu′′0v′0 + u′0v′′0 )]
=
p0piu
′′
0v
′
0
∆
(u′0v
′′
0 + piu
′′
0u
′
0 − piu′′0m0v′′0 ) < 0.
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We have (dm0/dτ)|τ=1 > 0 and
dm1
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
− dm0
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
= {2u′0v′′20 +piu′′0v′′0 (4u0−3m0v′′0 )+pi2u′′20 (2u′0−3m0v′′0+m20v′′20 /u′0)}/∆ < 0.
Using (6), we have
x˜ =
m0u
′(w − pip0)
m1u′(w − τpip1) +m0u′(w − pip0) .
Differentiating yields
dx˜
dτ
∣∣∣∣
τ=1
=
3 [(dm0/dτ)u′0 −m0u′′0pi(dp0/dτ)]|τ=1 − [(dm1/dτ)u′1 −m1u′′1pi(p1 + τdp1/dτ)]|τ=1
4m0u′0
where,[
dm1
dτ
u′1 −m1u′′1pi
(
p1 + τ
dp1
dτ
)]∣∣∣∣
τ=1
= u′20 (piu
′′
0+v
′′
0 )[u
′
0v
′′
0+piu
′′
0(u
′
0−m0v′′0 )]p0/∆ < 0,
implying (dx˜/dτ)|τ=1 > 0.
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